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THE MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION FOR SRS
SURGERY: A PERSONAL DEDUCTION WITH BUSINESS
EFFECTS
by
David S. Kistler*

INTRODUCTION
This paper briefly explores the parameters for a medical
deduction for a specific surgery. The issue presented is
whether sexual reassignment surgery (SRS) is a nondeductible
cosmetic surgery procedure or a deductible medical expense, in
that it represents a necessarily prescribed treatment for a
medical disease. This issue has been raised in a recent tax
court case filed by Rhiannon 0 'Donnabhain against the
. .
I
Commzsswner.
Although a personal deduction is not a business
expense, many personal deductions affect businesses and are of
great concern to specific industries. Examples include interest
expense on home mortgages and medical expenses. The
former is a deduction favored by the home builders and
banking industries. The later is a deduction of concern to the
insurance and medical industries. All deductions are of interest
to tax preparation businesses.

*DavidS. Kistler is an Assistant Professor of Business
at the State University of New York at Potsdam.
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One specific type of medical deduction is the SRS
procedure. This procedure is used to treat Gender Identity
Disorder (Gill) and involves both physicians and
psychotherapists. Additional surgical procedures may also be
undertaken by individuals diagnosed with SRS. This includes
breast implant surgery, trachea shaving, nose realignment, lip
augmentation, cheek implants, chin shrinkage, and scalp
forwarding procedures. It is estimated that "1,000 to 2,000
Americans a year ... undergo sex-change operations."2 This
paper will explore the arguments for and against allowing this
expense as a tax deduction.
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE & TREASURY
REGULATIONS
Several parts of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 213
apply to the question of deductibility regarding a surgical
operation. The first subsection of this general rule of law
allows a deduction for medical expenses and reads "There shall
be allowed as a deduction the expenses paid during the taxable
year ... for medical care of the taxpayer."3 The second
subsection defines medical care as the "amount paid for the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body."4 The third subsection that is applicable is a limitation
restricting the term medical care by excluding "cosmetic
surgery or other similar procedures." 5 Finally, there is the
subsection where cosmetic surgery is defined as "any
procedure which is directed at improving the patient's
appearance and does not meaningfully promote the proper
function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease." 6
The Internal Revenue Regulations add insight to the
Internal Revenue Code. In Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(l)(ii) it is
stated that "[I.R.C.] § 213 will be confined strictly to expenses
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incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a
physical or mental defect or illness." The Regulations also
state that the question of a medical expense is "a question of
fact which depends upon the condition of the individual and the
nature of the services he receives." 7

Petitioner's physician never recommended the cruise. The Tax
Court found that the cruise was similarly related to a vacation
because it was not essential to the health of the petitioner. The
rule established was that expenses for a person's general health
are not deductible even if recommended by a doctor.

SETTING THE STAGE

In Revenue Ruling 97-9 the taxpayer, based upon a
doctor's recommendation, obtained a controlled substance for
medical reasons. This was a violation of federal law
(Controlled Substances Act). The Revenue Ruling stated that
expenses for a drug are not deductible if such a purchase
violates federal law notwithstanding the fact that a physician
recommended the purchase or that state law allows the
purchase.

The issue of whether or not to take an I.R.C. § 213
deduction for a medical surgery has several court created
guidelines. These general rules attempt to clarify the question
of what is deductible. Decisions made generally rest upon a
question of fact.
In Thoene v. Comm 'r 8 the plaintiff took dance lessons
to help correct emotional and physical problems with he had
been diagnosed. Upon the advice of his doctor and
psychiatrist, petitioner took dance lessons to become engaged
with people while in a social environment for these problems.
Tax Court applied a rule that stated expenses which are
normally considered personal items are not deductible. The
dance lessons were deemed to be a normal personal item by the
court. It was found that no physical or psychiatric therapy
resulted from the dance lessons. Tax Court also stated that
there would be "rare situations when such expenses would lose
their identity as ordinary personal expenses and become
properly classified as medical care expenses." 9 The tax court
also was stated that "not every expenditure prescribed by a
physician is . . . a medical expense." 10 Neither would the
characterization of the treatment as beneficial be sufficient to
allow a deduction as a medical expense.

Other cases support this reasoning. In Miz/ 11 the
petitioner took a cruise to help lessen the physical problems of
hypertension, latent diabetes, and arteriosclerotic heart disease.

In Levine, 12 the Tax Court held that legal expenses for
the supervision of a mentally deficient person were not
deductible as a medical expense. Legal expenses are
deductible only if they are incurred in the pursuit of medical
care. The rule established for a medical deduction was the "but
for" test. The petitioner is required "to prove both that the
expenditures were an essential element of the treatment and
that they would not have otherwise been incurred for
nonmedical reasons." 13

A reverse situation occurred in Al-Murshidi, where the
opinion of a physician that an expenditure was cosmetic was
deemed to be incorrect based on the facts. The petitioner had
severe obesity. The Tax Court found that the excess skin
caused "skin breakdowns, sores, infections, pain, and
irritation." 14 The physician, a plastic surgeon, referred to the
corrective surgery as "cosmetic." The Tax Court stated that
obesity is a well recognized disease and that the excess skin
caused several medical problems. It was held that the surgery
to remove the excess skin was a deductible expense. A special
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note regarding this case is that under I.R.C. § 7463 " this
opinion should not be cited as authority" 15 because it is only a
memorandum decision.
The personal expenditure for medical reasons rule is a
presumption and can be overcome by sufficient evidence. A
satisfactory nonmedical reason would be an expense for
business purposes. Such a situation took place in a case
regarding a breast enlargement. In Hess, 16 the petitioner
underwent surgery multiple times to enlarge her breasts to a
size 56N. Each silicone breast implant weighed approximately
10 pounds. Normally, a breast enlargement surgery would be
considered a personal expenditure. However, the court found
that an enlargement of this proportion "made her [petitioner]
appear 'freakish."' 17 Petitioner claimed that the implants were
only for her business as a professional exotic dancer and the
court found that her fees almost doubled after the surgery. A
similarity was drawn between the implants and a stage prop or
clothing that is useful only in a business setting. The Tax court
ruled in this situation that the "implants were so extraordinarily
large . . . that they were useful only in her business." 18 Tax
court relied upon the ordinary and necessary standard for
business expenses.
Acceptable medical treatment expenses which are
deductible also include items that affect the body in structure or
function. In Revenue Ruling 2003-57 this concept included
breast reconstruction surgery due to cancer in that it
"ameliorates a deformity directly related to a disease" 19 and
laser eye surgery because it "is a procedure that meaningfully
promotes the proper function of the body."20 Revenue Ruling
1973-201 included expenses for prevention "of conception and
childbirth or to terminate pregnancy."21 This ruling also
covered vasectomies on the grounds that "purpose of the
operation is to affect both a structure and a function of the
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body" 22 and therefore, deductible. Such operations do not need
the recommendation of a physician. Revenue Ruling 73-603
allowed a deduction for an abortion where the petitioner sought
the operation without advice of a physician.
In 2004, Katherine T. Pratt indicated in a Cornell Law
Review article that "several courts have also held that sexual
reassignment surgery for treatment of a transsexual with
Gender Identity Disorder is a medical necessity." 23 The article,
however, cites only one case, Pinneke v. Preisser. 24 The Eight
Circuit Court of Appeals in Pinneke stated that "from this
record, it appears that radical sex conversion surgery is the
only medical treatment available to relieve or solve the
problems of a true transsexual. " 25

THE PROBLEM
In the current case of Rhiannon O'Donnabhain, the
petitioner took a deduction for SRS and other surgical
operations (breast implant surgery, trachea shaving, nose
realignment, lip augmentation, cheek implants, chin shrinkage,
scalp forward procedures). Petitioner desired to completely
change his body function from male to female. The Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) initially allowed the deductions, but
then denied the deductions as cosmetic surgery and sent her a
deficiency notice. O' Donnabhain filed suit in Tax Court in
2007 rather than pay the deficiency notice.

On behalf of the Petitioner, there were two
psychotherapists that examined the taxpayer and both
concluded that the taxpayer had GID. It was also found that
the "the strict pre-surgery criteria of the Harry Benjamin
Standards" 26 had been met. These criteria included 12 months
of receiving hormone therapy to begin a change from a male
body to a female body, living as a female for 12 months before
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a SRS operation (referred to as "real-life experience"), and
receiving ongoing psychotherapy to adjust for the change. The
taxpayer showed that GID is a recognized disease as stated in
the American Psychological Association's handbook on mental
disorders, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental
Disorders, l hEdition (DSM-N) (hereafter referred to as the
APA handbook). SRS is the recommended medically
necessary treatment for this mental disorder (GID).
The deduction is attacked by the IRS from a number of
different positions. First, two expert witnesses are utilized to
discredit SRS treatment. Dr. Park Dietz's testimony attempts
supports the position that GID is not a pathology problem and
thus not a disease. Pathology is defined as
abnormal, either an anatomic or physiologic disease. 7 The
testimony of Dr. Chester Schmidt, Jr. is intends to support the
position that SRS is not able to meaningfully treat GID and that
GID is not a universally accepted diagnosis. Second, the IRS
uses the APA handbook against Petitioner because it has
limiting statements. Some disorders stated in the APA
handbook are clearly identified as being merely social or
behavior problems. Examples are caffeine intoxication, sleep
disorder, and jet lag. In addition, a cautionary statement is
made in the APA handbook that a specific category may not
meet legal criteria for a disease. The final argument by the IRS
is that surgery and hormone treatment to bring about an
appearance change is cosmetic in nature.
ANALYSIS
The pathology argument by Dr. Dietz is simply not
substantiated. No Internal Revenue Code section, Treasury
Regulation, court case, Revenue Ruling, or Revenue
Memorandum supports the position that deductibility is denied
if a disease, either anatomic or physiologic, is not of an
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abnormal nature. Abnormality or normality is not the standard
to determine deductibility. There are many physical diseases
that are rare in occurrence or nature, but have treatments
acceptable as medical deductions.
The APA Handbook itself contradicts Dr. Schmidt's
belief that SRS is not a meaningful treatment for GID. This
"bible" of The American Psychological Association states the
generally recognized standards of treatment for its listed mental
and psychological diseases. Although Dr. Schmidt is correct in
stating that GID is not accepted by all medical practitioners as
the accepted diagnosis, GID is widely held to be the standard
diagnosis for this mental condition.
Statements in the APA handbook are not decisive in
and of themselves. Although some disorders in the AP A
handbook are categorized as merely social or behavior
problems, GID is not one of them. Therefore, the terminology
of behavioral problem does not apply to SRS. In addition, the
cautionary statement in the AP A handbook regarding the legal
criteria is a general disclaimer that the psychological viewpoint
of a disease may not meet the legal definition. Each specific
disorder mentioned in the APA handbook, then, has to be
examined. The real question is, what is the legal standard?
The problem here is one of a mental disorder, which is not
easily accepted as a medical problem due to the failure to see a
need for a physical correction.
Finally, it is the IRS position on SRS "that sex-change
surgery is a choice, like cosmetic surgery, rather than a
deductible medical expense like psychiatric care." 28 However,
the question of choice is not the standard set by the Internal
Revenue Code, the Treasury Regulations, or the courts for the
deductibility of a surgical operation. The IRS argument is that
this surgery is merely an improvement on one's appearance
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and that it is for personal satisfaction. The IRS could also
argue that the surgery does not promote a proper body function
in that the body the petitioners have already functions properly.
The petitioner simply desires a different function. There is no
restoration of the body to normal functioning and there is no
avoidance of immediate danger of physical harm. Many of the
individual procedures obtained by petitioner could be
construed as personal expenditures. The Senate Finance
Committee report in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, for example, stated that "procedures such as hair
removal electrolysis, hair transplants, liposuction, and face lift
operations generally are not deductible." 29 The IRS could take
the position that SRS is a choice for psychological distress only
in that the petitioner is seeking a correction in perception of
him or her self. However, the APA handbook states that GID
is "a profound disturbance of the individual's sense of identity
with regards to"30 their sex.
In examining the question of choice, SRS "is not treated
by physicians as a purely elective surgery like cosmetic
surgery."31 The general viewpoint of psychotherapists is that
SRS "allows a person to function better and be more
comfortable in society. " 32 GID is considered a mental disease
and SRS is a corrective measure or treatment. What must be
kept in mind is that the opinion of physicians has not been
always a standard employed to determine deductibility. For
example, in Thoene the physician recommended the treatment
of dance lessons for which the petitioner was denied a
deductible medical expense. Tax Court denied the deduction.
The court stated that the opinion of a physician is not a
standard to examine the question of deductibility. In a reverse
situation, the physician in Al-Murshidi referred to the treatment
as cosmetic, but the Tax Court held that the expenditure was a
deductible medical expense.
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Petitioner claims that having GID causes "severe
emotional pain"33 and that SRS is required for a normallife. 34
Life in the current state for petitioner was very unsatisfying35
and there could have been psychological or physical damage to
his or her well-being.36 These statements are supported by the
doctors who examined petitioner and required pre-determined
criteria (Harry Benjamin Standards) 37 to be completed before
SRS was approved. GID was considered a congenital
abnormality (defect at birth) for petitioner. 38
CONCLUSION
Relying upon the Internal Revenue Code and the
Treasury Regulations the correct standard for surgery is
defined as a "diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or
prevention of disease. "39 A limitation for a nonallowable
deduction exists in I.R.C. § 213 for cosmetic surgery. There is
a two-pronged requirement under this limitation in that the
cosmetic type of surgery is for improving the petitioner's
appearance and not treating a disease. The Internal Revenue
Code and the Treasury Regulations both recognize mental and
physical illnesses or diseases. Both state that a medical
expense is deductible for the alleviation of a mental illness.
GID is defined by psychotherapists as a mental disorder in the
AP A handbook. SRS is used to treat the recognized disease of
GID. Using these standards, SRS is a medical deductible
expense.
Several rules have been established from Tax Court
cases. First, there is the "rare situation" standard. The Thoene
case established that an expense usually deemed as a personal
item can be a medical expense deduction except for "rare
situations." SRS is certainly not a rare procedure if 1,000 to
2,000 such operations are performed each year.
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Next, the question is what is personal? SRS has never
been clearly defined as a personal item. The Tax Court in Hess
stated that neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury
Regulations "contain a definition of 'personal. "'40 Normally,
breast implants have been treated as personal expenditures
because the surgery is done to enhance the appearance of the
taxpayer. However, in Hess the breast implants were held to
be deductible. It can also be argued that SRS changes the
function of the body and is not merely a physical improvement.
Even the Internal Revenue Code classifies a change in the
function of the body as a deductible medical expense.
In Levine the petitioner was required to defeat the "but
for" test. Petitioner was required to prove two elements for
deductibility. First is that the treatment is an essential element
for the cure of the disease. Second is that the expenditure
would not have occurred except for medical reasons. In
regards to the first element, a question could be raised what
other type of treatment could be administered to correct for
GID? To date, there are no other generally accepted
treatments. Another question is whether there must be only
one clear treatment or whether several treatments could
coexist? In regards to the second element the question could
be raised why would one want to have a surgical operation that
changes the function of the body other than for medical
reasons? This is not merely an improvement to one's body, but
a radical change.
From an examination of the statutes and court cases,
SRS should fall within the purview of I.R.C. § 213 as a
deductible medical expense. This is based upon: 1) the fact
that GID is a well-recognized mental disorder and SRS is the
only generally accepted treatment for that disorder (based upon
the American Psychological Association's psychiatric
handbook on mental disorders), 2) the Internal Revenue Code

allows for the treatment of a mental disorder to be a deductible
medical expense, 3) in Al-Murshidi the Tax Court found that
expenditures for a well-recognized disease are deductible, and
4) the petitioner met all the pre-determined rigorous criteria for
the surgery.
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POSSESSION, PERFECTION AND PRIORITY IN A
FRAUDULENT ENVIRONMENT

by
Elizabeth A. Marcuccio *
John W. Arpey **

I. INTRODUCTION

Are fraudulent mortgage banking transactions on the
rise? Today banks operate in an environment of increased
competition, tightening credit restrictions due to the sub-prime
mortgage lending fiasco, and a decreased volume of loans
processed and sold. Their financial survival is in jeopardy.
The purpose of this article is to examine the rights of innocent
parties who are the victims of a scheme to defraud in
transactions involving mortgage assignments.
A secured real property transaction consists of two documents:
the mortgage document which creates a security interest in the
real property, and the note which represents the debt that is
secured by the mortgage.
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